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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
CATHARINE E. DAVIS
Plaintiff MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
10-cv-3812 (KAM)(LB)
-against-




MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On August 17, 2010, Catharine E. Davis ("plaintiff") 
commenced this pro se action pursuant to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, 
alleging discrimination in the terms and conditions of her 
employment by the New York City Department of Education ("DOE") 
and Lisa Linder ("Linder"), the principal of Intermediate School 
("I.S.") 302 (collectively, "defendants"). Presently before the 
court is defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). For the 
reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is 
granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
I. Complaint Allegations and Procedural History
The following facts, taken from plaintiff's pro se 
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motion to dismiss, are assumed to be true for the purpose of the 
instant motion.1 (See generally ECF No. 1, Complaint ("Compl.");
ECF No. 20-8, Plaintiff's Affidavit/Affirmation In Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion, dated 4/11/2011 ("Pl. Opp."); ECF No. 21,
Amended Reply to Plaintiff's Initial Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, dated 5/9/2011 ("Pl. Sur-Reply.").)
Plaintiff worked as a certified health teacher at I.S. 302 from 
2002 to 2009. (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6.)2 Plaintiff alleges that 
from 2002 through the school year ending in 2007, she received 
satisfactory performance evaluations. (Id.) For the school 
years ending in 2008 and 2009, however, plaintiff asserts that 
the school's principal, Linder, evaluated plaintiff's 
performance as unsatisfactory. (Id.)
On October 29, 2008, plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident that she alleges left her disabled for three 
months, until January 31, 2009. (Id.) A disability claim form
signed by plaintiff and dated December 8, 2008, states that she
was diagnosed with a "c-spine injury, rt. shoulder injury, [and]
1 Although the court's considerations are generally limited to the pleadings 
when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, because plaintiff's pro se 
Complaint must be construed liberally, it is "appropriate to consider 
plaintiff's additional materials, such as [her] opposition memorandum." 
Burgess v. Goord, No. 98-CV-2077, 1999 WL 33458, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 
1999) (quoting Gadson v. Goord, No. 96 Civ. 7544, 1997 WL 714878, at *1 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1977)) .
2 The page numbers cited herein are those automatically assigned by the 
court's electronic case filing system.
2
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lumbar back disorder" with symptoms of pain from all three 
injuries. (ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp. at 10.) The date of 
plaintiff's first treatment for these injuries was October 30, 
2008. (Id.) After plaintiff used her last sick day, she was
given a "grace period" from November 8, 2008 to December 7,
2008, (see id.), and the DOE granted plaintiff a "leave of
absence without pay . . . for restoration of health from 12/8/08
to 1/30/09," (ECF No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 6). During 
plaintiff's absence, an unlicensed substitute teacher, who 
plaintiff alleges was a personal friend of Linder's, covered 
plaintiff's teaching responsibilities. (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 
6.)
Plaintiff alleges that while she was on leave, Linder 
offered to assess plaintiff's annual performance as 
"satisfactory" as long as plaintiff agreed to give up her job as 
health teacher and accept a job as chorus teacher, a position 
for which plaintiff had no license or experience. (See ECF No. 
21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 3). Plaintiff contends that this 
"proposition" was motivated by Linder's desire to give 
plaintiff's job as health teacher to the substitute teacher, who 
was Linder's friend. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that she
3
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nevertheless received an unsatisfactory rating because Linder 
failed to follow through on her "proposition." (Id.)
When plaintiff returned to work, the school's Union 
Chapter Leader informed her that she would have to share her 
$3,000 year-end cash bonus with the substitute teacher who had 
covered her teaching responsibilities during her absence. (ECF 
No. 1, Compl. at 6.) As a result, plaintiff received a bonus of 
only $1,000. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the $3,000 year-end
bonus was allotted to her based on her inclusion in the school's 
Table of Organization as a tenured, state-certified teacher, and 
the distribution of her bonus to the non-certified substitute 
teacher was contrary to the terms of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement ("CBA") established by the DOE and plaintiff's labor 
union. (See ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6; ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp. at
3-4; ECF No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 2.)* 4
It is not clear from plaintiff's submissions whether, in stating that Linder 
failed to follow through on her proposition, plaintiff means that Linder did 
not ultimately fill plaintiff's position as health teacher with the 
substitute, or that Linder still gave plaintiff an unsatisfactory rating even 
though plaintiff did accept the job as chorus teacher.
4 The terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment with DOE as a teacher are 
governed by the CBA entered into by the DOE and the United Federation of 
Teachers ("UFT"). (See ECF No. 20-4, Agreement between The Board of
Education of the City School District of the City of New York and United 
Federation of Teachers Local 2, American Federal of Teachers, AFL-CIO ("CBA 
Agmt.") at 1-2; see also ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp. at 3-4.) Pursuant to the 
CBA, educators participate in a school-wide bonus program, which awards them 
"substantial cash bonuses for student achievement gains." (ECF No. 20-5, CBA 
Agmt. at 52.) The CBA further states that "each Participant School will 
determine the methodology for distributing any award it earns for school-wide 
performance" but that "[t]he size of each Participant School's total award 
for distribution in 2007-08 shall be the number of full-time UFT-represented 
employees on the school's table of organization times three thousand dollars 
($3,000)." (Id. at 53.) The CBA directs each school to form a compensation
4
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On June 4, 2010, plaintiff filed a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that 
the DOE and Linder discriminated against her based upon her 
alleged disability. (See ECF No. 1, Compl. at 4.) On June 24, 
2010, the EEOC decided that, based upon its investigation, it 
was "unable to conclude that the information obtained
establishe[d] a violation of the [law]. (Id. at 7.) The EEOC
issued plaintiff a "right to sue" letter. (See id.)
On August 17, 2010, plaintiff filed the instant 
action, alleging that defendants discriminated against her 
because of her disability, by evaluating her performance as 
unsatisfactory and by denying her the full amount of her bonus. 
(See id. at 6.) On August 27, 2010, the court denied 
plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 
No. 3, Order, dated 8/27/2010.) On March 10, 2011, the court
committee that decides eligibility for and the size of individual awards to 
UFT-represented staff members. (Id.) The CBA provides that the compensation 
committee "shall presume that all UFT-represented staff employed at a school 
that meets the targets for the bonus have contributed to the school's 
achievement to some extent and therefore should share in the bonus." (Id.) 
Further, the compensation committee shall decide "whether to make equal 
individual awards to all eligible UFT staff, equal awards to all those in the 
same title, or whether to make differential awards." (Id. at 54.) If an 
individual believes that an award is "arbitrary, capricious or in clear 
violation of the law or of the procedures and standards [set out in the 
CBA]," the individual may appeal to an Oversight Committee comprised of the 
Chancellor and the President of the UFT. (Id.)
5
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denied without prejudice plaintiff's motion to appoint pro bono 
counsel. (ECF No. 12, Order, dated 3/10/2011.)5
On March 17, 2011, defendants served plaintiff with 
the instant motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 20-7, Memorandum of
Law In Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, 
dated 3/17/2011 ("Def. Mem.").) Plaintiff opposed the motion on 
April 11, 2011. (See ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp.) Defendants served
plaintiff with their reply and filed the fully briefed motion on 
April 26, 2011. (See ECF No. 20-9, Reply Memorandum of Law In
Further Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated 
4/26/2011 ("Def. First Reply").) Without authority or 
permission to do so, on May 9, 2011, plaintiff filed an amended 
reply to plaintiff's initial opposition to defendants' motion to 
dismiss. (See ECF No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply.) On May 13, 2011, the
court granted defendants leave to respond to plaintiff's 
additional submission and ordered that no further submissions 
from any party regarding the instant motion would be permitted.
By letter dated March 7, 2011, defendants requested a pre-motion conference, 
indicating their intent to file a motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 11, First 
Motion for Pre-Motion Conference, dated 3/7/2011.) On March 11, 2011, the 
court waived the pre-motion conference requirement because plaintiff is 
proceeding pro se. (Order, dated 3/11/2011.) On March 16, 2011, plaintiff 
filed a motion for default judgment, alleging that defendants' March 7, 2011 
letter requesting a pre-motion conference did not constitute an answer to the 
Complaint within twenty-one days, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(a)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No. 13, Letter Motion for Default Judgment, dated 
3/16/2011.) On March 29, 2011, the court denied plaintiff's motion for 
default judgment because, pursuant to this court's Individual Rule IV(B)(1), 
defendants' March 7, 2011 letter requesting a pre-motion conference 
constituted timely service of a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
(See Order, dated 3/29/2011; ECF No. 14, Response in Opposition, dated 
3/28/2011.)
6
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(See Order re Letter/Amended Reply and Motion for Extension of 
Time, dated 5/13/2011.) Despite the court's order, however, 
plaintiff moved for leave to file a third reply to defendants' 
motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 25, Letter Motion for Leave to 
File Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response, dated 
5/17/2011.) The court denied plaintiff's request. (See Order 
Denying Motion for Leave to File, dated 5/24/2011.) Defendants 
filed their authorized supplemental response on May 18, 2011. 
(See ECF No. 24, Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Amended 
Opposition, dated 5/18/2011 ("Def. Second Reply").)
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)6 and 12(b)(6) on the 
grounds that (a) the Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
under the ADA; and (b) Linder is not subject to suit under the 
ADA. (See ECF No. 20-7, Def. Mem. at 6.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief 
that it is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
6 Although defendants cite Rule 12(b)(2) as a basis for their motion to 
dismiss, (See ECF No. 20-7, Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, dated 3/17/2011, at 1), they have not 
provided, and the court has not found, any support for the argument that the 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants. Thus, defendants' motion 
to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is denied.
7
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Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard is met "when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged." Id. A court should not dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim if the factual 
allegations sufficiently "raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The court's 
function "is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the 
complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might 
be offered in support thereof." Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 
636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980). "[T]he issue is not whether a 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is 
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Todd v.
Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), the court "accept[s] as true all factual statements 
alleged in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences 
in favor of the non-moving party." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet 
Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). However, "conclusory
allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss." 
Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 337 (2d
8
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Cir. 2006) (citation and internal brackets omitted). On a 
motion to dismiss, the court limits its considerations to: (1)
the factual allegations in the complaint; (2) documents attached 
to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in it by reference; 
(3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken; and (4) 
documents that are "integral" to the complaint. Corbett v. 
eHome Credit Corp., No. 10-CV-26, 2010 WL 1687704, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) (citing Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 
987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993)); Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that "even where 
a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may 
nevertheless consider it where the complaint 'relies heavily 
upon its terms and effect,' which renders the document 
'integral' to the complaint").
Further, it is "well established that the submissions 
of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 
'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'"
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
2006); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980) (holding 
that a pro se party's pleadings must be liberally construed in 
his favor and are held to a less stringent standard than the 
pleadings drafted by lawyers). In addition, because a pro se 
plaintiff's complaint must be construed liberally, it is 
appropriate for the court to consider the factual allegations in
9
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plaintiff's opposition materials to supplement the allegations 
in her Complaint. Burgess v. Goord, No. 98-CV-2077, 1999 WL 
33458, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999) (quoting Gadson v. 
Goord, No. 96 Civ. 7544, 1997 WL 714878, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 1977)). Nevertheless, even plaintiffs who are 
proceeding pro se must comply with any relevant procedural and 
substantive rules, and to survive a motion to dismiss, a pro se 
complaint must "state a plausible claim for relief." Harris v. 
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1950); see generally Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination 
pursuant to the ADA need not plead a prima facie case of 
discrimination. Bakeer v. Nippon Cargo Airlines, Co., No. 09- 
CV-3374, 2011 WL 3625103, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011),
adopted by 2011 WL 3625083 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011); see also 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (noting 
that the "Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading 
standard for employment discrimination suits"). Instead, the 
claim "need only give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Lee 
v. HealthFirst, Inc., No. 04-CV-8787, 2006 WL 177175, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2006) (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 
512). Thus, "[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must specifically allege the events claimed to
10
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constitute intentional discrimination as well as circumstances 
giving rise to a plausible inference of . . . discriminatory
intent." Collazo v. BBDO NY, No. 96-CV-9507, 1997 WL 746447, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997) (citing Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 
F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994)).
II. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Title I of the ADA provides that "no covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, 
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, 
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination pursuant to the ADA, a plaintiff must show that 
(1) her employer is subject to the ADA; (2) she was disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she was otherwise qualified 
to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and (4) she suffered an adverse 
employment action because of her disability. Brady v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
I. Employer is Subject to the ADA
Defendants do not dispute that the New York City 
Department of Education is subject to the ADA. See Teachout v.
11
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N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 04-CV-945, 2006 WL 452022, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (DOE did not contest that it was an 
employer subject to the ADA).
Defendants properly argue, however, that an individual 
cannot be sued in his or her personal capacity under the ADA.
See Cohn v. KeySpan Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 143, 154 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) ("Individuals may not be sued in their individual or 
personal capacity under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act."); Mabry 
v. Neighborhood Defender Serv. , 769 F. Supp. 2d 381, 391 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]he ADA does not provide for personal
liability on the part of non-employer individuals"); Darcy v. 
Lippman, 356 F. App'x 434, 437 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[T]he ADA and
ADEA . . . do not provide for actions against individual
supervisors."). Further, "there is no cause of action seeking 
monetary damages for employment discrimination under the ADA . .
. against a supervisor in his or her 'official' or 
'representative' capacity." Cohn, 713 F. Supp. at 154-55 
(citing Fox v. State Univ. of New York, 497 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007)). Here, plaintiff has sued Linder as principal 
of I.S. 302. Thus, plaintiff's claims against Linder are 
dismissed with prejudice.
II. Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA
"The ADA defines a disabled individual as one who has 
'(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
12
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7one or more major life activities of such individual ; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such 
impairment.'" Padilla v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, No. 09-CV- 
5291, 2010 WL 3835182, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S. § 
12102(1)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).7 8 In a disability 
discrimination case, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
establishing that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 
See Ramirez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 481 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). The determination of whether a plaintiff has a 
disability within this meaning must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). The court must "construe the 
definition of disability 'in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of this Act.'" Negron v. City of New York, No. 10-CV- 
2757, 2011 WL 4737068, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)).
"[A] plaintiff who is 'regarded as disabled' is 
protected under the ADA even if she is not actually disabled." 
Joseph v. North Shore Univ. Hosp., No. 08-CV-3799, 2011 WL
7 "Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, lifting, 
bending, speaking, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, 
and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
8 The EEOC has promulgated administrative regulations implementing the ADA. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 ("EEOC Regulations"). In the Second Circuit, the EEOC 
Regulations are entitled to "great deference" when interpreting the ADA. 
Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 140 F.3d 144, 150 n.3 (2d Cir.
1998).
13
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573582, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011). Until recently, a
plaintiff who alleged she was "regarded as" having a disability
was required to show that the perceived disability was one that
"substantially limited a major life activity." Id.
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), Pub. L. No.
110-325, 2008 Stat. 3406 (2008) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12102 (1990)), however, set forth a new, more
lenient, standard for determining whether an individual is
"regarded as disabled":
An individual meets the requirement of 
'being regarded as having such an 
impairment' if the individual establishes 
that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under this chapter because 
of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment 
limits or is perceived to limit a major life 
activity.
Laurent v. G & G Bus ServInc., No. 10-CV-4055, 2011 WL 
2683201, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3)(A)) (emphasis added), adopted by 2011 WL 2693651 
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2011). Pursuant to this more lenient 
standard, an employee is "not required to show that the 
disability [s]he is perceived as suffering from is one that 
actually limits, or is perceived to limit, a major life 
activity." Darcy v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-2246, 2011 WL 
841375, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). Nor does the employee
have to "show that the employer had a reasonable basis for
14
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perceiving [her] as suffering from a disability; [the statute] 
merely requires [her] to show that the employer did so perceive 
[her]." Id. The ADAA specifies, however, that the "regarded 
as" definition of disability does not apply to impairments that 
are both transitory and minor. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B); see 
also 29 C.F.R. §1630.15(f) (2011) ("It may be a defense to a
charge of discrimination by an individual claiming coverage 
under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability 
that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or 
would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) 'transitory and 
minor.'"). An impairment is transitory if it has "an actual or 
expected duration of 6 months or less." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(3)(B). "Whether the impairment at issue is or would be 
'transitory and minor' is to be determined objectively." 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011).
Construing plaintiff's Complaint broadly, as it must, 
the court finds that plaintiff claims she was regarded as 
disabled from October 29, 2008 until January 31, 2009. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges - and defendants do not dispute 
- that the DOE granted her a "leave of absence without pay" 
following her automobile accident. (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6; ECF 
No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 3.) Plaintiff attached to her Sur- 
Reply a "Confidential Medical Report and Medical Evaluation," 
signed by the school medical director, indicating that plaintiff
15
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was granted a "leave of absence without pay for restoration of 
health from December 8, 2008 to January 30, 2009. (ECF No. 21, 
Pl. Sur-Reply at 6.)9 Thus, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 
that, at least during the period when she was on unpaid 
disability leave, defendants regarded her as disabled. Although 
plaintiff's three-month period of disability appears to be 
"transitory," it is not apparent from the face of the Complaint 
that plaintiff's impairment was "minor." Accordingly, because 
the Complaint must only give defendants fair notice of 
plaintiff's claims, the court finds that plaintiff has 
sufficiently alleged that she was disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA.
III. Adverse Employment Action
An "adverse employment action" for the purpose of a 
discrimination claim pursuant to the ADA is a "'materially 
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.'" 
Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d 
Cir. 2004). A change in working conditions is materially 
adverse if it is "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or 
an alteration of job responsibilities." Id. (quoting Terry v. 
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003)). Examples of
9 The court notes that the leave of absence indicated on the Confidential 
Medical Report and Medical Evaluation (December 8, 2008 to January 30, 2009), 
(ECF No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 6), is shorter than the period plaintiff 
alleges she was disabled and absent from school (October 29, 2008 to January 
31, 2009), (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6).
16
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materially adverse changes in working conditions include "a 
termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in 
wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of 
benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or 
other indices . . . unique to a particular situation." Terry,
336 F.3d at 138 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff appears to claim that she suffered two 
adverse employment actions as a result of her disability: (1)
she received "unsatisfactory" performance evaluations for the 
school years ending in 2008 and 2009; and (2) she received only 
$1,000 of her expected $3,000 annual bonus. (See ECF No. 1, 
Compl. at 6.)
As a matter of law, an "unsatisfactory" performance 
evaluation alone does not amount to an adverse employment action 
because such an evaluation does not constitute a material change 
in employment. See Valentine v. Standard & Poor's, 50 F. Supp. 
2d 262, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that negative
evaluations alone, without any evidence of a resulting material 
change in work conditions, did not constitute an adverse 
action); Browne v. City Univ. of New York, 419 F. Supp. 2d 315, 
332 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A negative evaluation alone, absent some
accompanying adverse result such as demotion, diminution in 
wages, or other tangible loss, does not constitute an adverse 
employment action."). On the other hand, where a negative
17
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performance evaluation results in an adverse change in work 
conditions, it may be considered an adverse employment action. 
See Antonmarchi v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 03 
Civ. 7735, 2008 WL 4444609, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) 
(finding that plaintiff had suffered an adverse employment 
action where he was denied a wage increase as a result of a 
negative evaluation); Cunningham v. Consol. Edison, Inc., No. 
03-CV-3522, 2006 WL 842914, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006)
(holding that deliberately failing an employee on a training 
exam that could lead to promotion constitutes an adverse 
employment action).
Here, plaintiff claims that Linder evaluated her 
performance as unsatisfactory "for the school-years ended 2008 
and 2009." (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff does not allege 
that these unsatisfactory performance ratings directly resulted 
in any materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of 
her employment. Further, plaintiff received her first 
unsatisfactory rating at the end of the 2008 school year, before 
she allegedly became disabled on October 29, 2008. Accordingly, 
any claim that her negative performance ratings constituted an 
adverse employment action must fail.
Nevertheless, plaintiff's claims survive the instant 
motion to dismiss because she has sufficiently alleged a 
separate adverse employment action, namely that as a result of
18
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her disability leave, she was required to share her allotted 
bonus with a substitute teacher. (Id.) Several courts have 
found that the denial of a bonus can constitute an adverse 
employment action. See, e.g., Ebanks v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 320, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Denial of a 
raise or merit bonus where one is warranted constitutes an 
adverse job action."); Graves v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., No. 
07-CV-5471, 2010 WL 997178, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010)
(finding the denial of a bonus, among other things, to be 
sufficient to plead an adverse employment action and survive a 
motion to dismiss); HealthFirst, 2006 WL 177175, at *9 (finding 
the denial of a bonus to be an adverse employment action and 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Hunter v. St.
Francis Hosp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 534, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("It is 
well settled that the denial of a bonus or a merit increase do 
constitute a material adverse change."). On the other hand, the 
denial of a bonus that is entirely discretionary would not 
constitute an adverse employment action. See Boyar v. City of 
New York, No. 10-CV-65, 2010 WL 4345737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
28, 2010) (where plaintiff did not suggest that bonus was 
awarded as a matter of course or that he could rely on it, 
"[d]efendants' decision not to provide discretionary pay did not 
change the terms or conditions of Plaintiff's employment").
19
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Defendants argue that pursuant to the terms of the 
CBA, the compensation committee has the discretion to determine 
the amount of each teacher's bonus.10 1 (ECF No. 20-7, Def. Mem. 
at 8; ECF No. 20-9, Def. First Reply at 5-6.) Defendants 
further assert that if plaintiff believed that her bonus award 
was arbitrary, capricious, or in clear violation of the law, she 
should have filed an appeal with the Oversight Committee, and 
subsequently filed an Article 78 proceeding in state court.
(ECF No. 24, Def. Second Reply at 2.) Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, insists that the $3,000 year-end bonus was a 
"contractually designated bonus" to which she was "fully 
entitled on an equal basis with other staff of [her] status," 
(ECF No. 21, Pl. Sur-Reply at 5), and that it was "shared among 
all UFT-represented employees." (ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp. at 4.)
At this early stage in the litigation, the court lacks 
sufficient evidence to conclude as a matter of law that 
plaintiff's bonus was entirely discretionary. Accordingly, the
11
10 Defendants cite to the following provision of the CBA, which states, in 
relevant part:
The compensation committee may decide to consider . .
. whether to make equal individual awards to all 
eligible UFT staff, equal awards to all those in the 
same title, or whether to make differential awards.
(ECF No. 20-5, CBA Agmt. at 54.)
11 Further, plaintiff's charge of disability discrimination, appended to her 
Complaint, alleges that the substitute teacher with whom she shared her bonus 
was unlicensed as a teacher. (ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6.) Thus, the unlicensed 
substitute and personal friend of the principal does not appear to qualify as 
a UFT-represented staff member under the terms of the CBA.
20
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court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state 
a claim that the withholding of $2,000 of her expected bonus was 
an adverse employment action.
IV. Discriminatory Intent
At the pleading stage, "a plaintiff is required to set 
forth factual circumstances from which discriminatory motivation 
for [an adverse employment] action can be inferred. Allegations 
supporting motive may include preferential treatment given to 
similarly situated individuals or remarks that convey 
discriminatory animus." Mabry, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (citing 
Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Portee
v. Deutsche Bank, No. 03-CV-9380, 2006 WL 559448, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2006) ("[D]rawing an inference of . . .
discrimination from the award of a discretionary bonus requires 
that such an award differ meaningfully from those awarded to 
other, similarly situated individuals").
As evidence of defendants' discriminatory intent, 
plaintiff asserts that other teachers who took leave during the 
school year, as well as teachers who received unsatisfactory 
ratings, were not required to share their bonus with substitute 
teachers. (See ECF No. 1, Compl. at 6; see also ECF No. 21, Pl. 
Sur-Reply at 4.) Indeed, plaintiff alleges that teachers whose 
classes were taught by the same substitute teacher who covered 
for plaintiff during her absence still received their full
21
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bonuses. (ECF No. 20-8, Pl. Opp. at 4.) Defendants contend 
that plaintiff has failed to show an inference of discrimination 
because she fails to identify by name other similarly situated 
teachers who were absent during the school year for reasons 
other than medical leave, yet still received their full bonus. 
(ECF No. 20-9, Def. First Reply at 6, 2.) "[W]hether or not 
[the plaintiff] has correctly defined which employees are 
similarly situated to her . . . is a question of fact that is
not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss."
HealthFirst, 2006 WL 177175, at *7 (citations omitted). For 
purposes of combating defendants' motion, plaintiff has 
adequately pleaded the circumstances she believes to be 
discriminatory, thereby giving defendants fair notice of her 
claims and the grounds upon which such claims rest. A more 
detailed account of the alleged discriminatory conditions of 
employment is not required at this time. Accordingly, 
defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above (1) defendants' motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendant Linder is granted 
with prejudice; and (2) defendants' motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's claims against defendant DOE is denied. The parties 
are strongly encouraged to engage in settlement negotiations 
rather than spend additional time, money, and resources on
22
further motion practice. Defendants are directed to serve a 
copy of this Memorandum and Order on plaintiff and to file a 
declaration of service on the docket by January 19, 2012.
SO ORDERED
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United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
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